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The resurgence of the term 'civil society' has been intimately
linked to the developments of 1989/91. The dissident movement
in Eastern Europe had put the confrontation of 'society1, i.e.
politically active and independent groups, with the
apparatuses of 'power' on the agenda. Thus, the seminal
accords of Gdansk in 1980 were seen as articulating a new
'social contract', the parties of which were 'society' on one
side and 'power', on the other. 'Social contract' has thus
been conceived, not as the founding act of society, but as.a
fundamental re-ordering of basic relations of power. 'Society'
was seen as fundamentally opposed to institutionalised power.
Its constitution by a self-conscious act meant an exemplary
challenge to existing structures of dominance that denied any
independent forms of debate, and above all, of organisation
(cf. Keen© 1988).
The treaty of Gdansk brought into focus the long-term struggle
around the monopoly of the ruling party on politics,
organisation and public life (Kur6n/Modelewski 1969). Thus,
the constitution of 'society' was co-extensive with the
struggle for the very conditions of its existence. In itself,
this juxtaposition of 'society' and 'power', which has been
articulated with particular clarity in Poland, may be seen as
an exemplary experience.
This is re-enforced whon we look at the immediate historical
background leading up to the turning-point of 1980.
Consecutive waves of open socio-political struggles in Poland
may be seen as phases of B process of social learning. They
are marked by the 'Polish October' in 1956; the student
movement of 1968 and the shipyard strikes of 1971? the strikes
of 1976 and finally, the formation of independent trade unions
as permanent organisational nuclei in 1980/81. In the process,
the experience of social confrontation had demonstrated the
importance of permanent organisation surpassing ephemeral
'councils'; it had also shown the importance of (relative),
autonomy from the state apparatus. This had become
particularly clear from the experience after the dissolution
of the strike committees in 1971 as a response of ths change
in government with the downfall of Gomulka. In 1980/81, a host
of independent union organisations represented a network of
organisation independent of ths state. And these groups
inevitably, under the circumstances, articulated political
questions besides immediate bread-and-butter issues. We shall
not go into any details of the ensuing processes which have
lead up to the overthrow of political monopolies in Eastern
Europe. What is important here is the fact that the eventual
break-up of these monopolies turned out to be coterminous with
the implosion of the entire power structure, as happened
successively, in 1989/91, in the then Warsaw Pact countries as
well as in the former Soviet Union.
We have sketched this model process in order to demonstrate
that the issue of 'civil society1 addresses premises that are
of cei'iUol importance for the structuring of any modern
political system. Further, the extent of actual opportunity
for public debate and the structure of the public sphere form
instrumental preconditions for determining modes of decision
making in such vital areas as development projects to be
pursued - at lesst where these are conceived to rest on some
measure of public consensus. In terms of this provisional
clarification, a whole range of conceptions employing the term
of 'civil society' would have to be rejected beforehand -
those that do not reflect civil society in juxtaposition to,
but rather es an adjunct of the state. Other variants see
'civil society1 as co-extensive with concrete state-bounded
societies, thus also eliminating the critical impulse which
the concept receives, not least from recent historical
experience as has. However, this does pose some problems upon
closer inspection. To clarify our own position, we shall first
give a somewhat more detailed critique of some of these
conceptions.
Certainly one the most influential of the various versions of
the identity theorem has been represented by Edward Shils. To
him, 'civil society' appears largely to be the same as
'bourgeois society', geared to the institutional framework of
the U.S. in particular, to 'representative institutions' and
to the market as the main structuring principle. Consensus and
public solidarity ere seen to restrain the tendency towards
universal warfare or tyranny which for Shils are Inherent in
'public pluralism'; these features are seen, at the same time,
to foster 'civil', viz., 'civilized' behaviour (see Shils
1991a, pp. 4, 9; 1991b, pp. 18sg.). In the tradition of
Telcott Parsons, Shils conceives 'civil society1 as the aim of
social evolution which is at the same time congruous with U.S.
society. Further, the close linkage between 'civil' and
'civilized' is indicative of a Hobbesian bias which sacrifices
In favour of order the tension that exists between civil
society and the state, but also tensions and debate within the
realm civil society. Only if we are prepared to "take into
account and to theorize such tension and conflict can we hope
to reach an understanding of civil society that eschews any
•cult of civil society' (Woods 1990, p. 63), while rather
accentuating its critical potential.
On this account. It may be called intriguing that a further
representative of the identity theorem is precisely the main
witness for a radical or leftist version of civil society,
Antonio Gramsci. In looking at his conception of society
civile in greater detail, we hope to sharpen our own notion of
civil society.
Gramsci moves squarely within the occidental intellectual
tradition when he states that 'in actual reality civil society
and the State are identified' (1980, p. 153). A recent German
treatment of Gramsci follows this through in identifying
society civile as an aspect of the state, while however seeing
it at the same time as a complex of hegemonial structures with
deep consequences even in everyday life (Kebir 1991). But the.
entire position may also be reversed when societa civile is
read as 'the mediating factor between the base and secondary
superstructures', i.e. the state, and thus as en 'autonomous
Space'; furthermore, this is seen BS Gramsci's specific
theoretical achievement over and above the position taken by
Marx (Bobbio 1988, p. 93).
It is our own contention that precisely Gramsci's treatment of
the relationship between civil society and the state opens up
the path towards a better understanding of the tension which
in Gramsci is highlighted by a further pair of central
concepts, i.e, 'positional warfare' »n& 'hegemony'. At the
seme time, Gramsci's treatment of society civile is closely
linked to the importance he accords to culture. This may sound
out of place only at first sight. Gramsci relates the •,.
problematic of 'positional warfare' directly to the existence
of socletck civile. In Russia, the absence of such a space had
enabled a quick Bolshevik victory in 1917, using the tactics
of a 'moving battle': 'In the East, the state was everything,
civil society was still only in its beginnings'; whereas in
the West, 'where social structures by themselves could turn
into well-armed trenches', 'there prevailed a balanced
relationship between the state and civil society1 (1967, p.
347). For Gramsci, this kind of relationship meant, in the
first instance, not so much checks and balances setting off
against each other the power positions of state and 'society'.
Rather, Gramsci saw above all the entrenchment of bourgeois
hegemony, of multi-facetted class dominance. The point is
about the stability of the 'historical bloc' once established
(lb., p. 291). This ia meant when Gramsci continues his
analysis of civil society in the West: 'The state was a
forward trench, and behind it, there was a string of
battlements and casemates ...' From this strategic strength of
the state,and of civil society, Gramsci inferred the necessity
of taking a discerning view, of 'thorough reconnaisance on the
national character' (ib., p. 347). This is the stratsgic place
of the 'struggle for a new culture' (id. 1983, p. 103) which,
loomed so large in Gramsci's thought. And this also eerved as
a starting point for a refined notion of 'base' and
'superstructure' and, in turn, of the ambivalent potentials
for action inherent in societd civile (cf. Bobbio 1988).
This refers us back to the courses history took in various
European societies, in France, above all, 'civil' - or
'bourgooio1 oooiety might indaed appeal: to be cuuyiuuus with
the state or 'nation' (cf id. 1955, p. 51). To the east of
Rhine and also in Italy, things .were more complicated. Here
the bourgeoisie, even during the 19th century, saw the need to
constitute itself against the state, only to be absorbed
lateron into an alliance with the ancien regime.
For most European countries outside Western Europe, this meant
that the programme of personal end collective freedom and
emancipation had to be taken up beyond the realm of
'bourgeois' society, in the first instance to be organized by
social democracy. These demands were combined here with the
overruling demands for social emancipation, and this may
explain the disdain authors like Karl Kautsky showed for
personal rights end liberties. Gramsci placed himself squarely
into this tradition.
R-H11 , the matching of societd clvllo and the atote is by no
means unequivocal in Gramsci. On closer inspection, civil
society turns out to be viewed by him as a field of
contradiction and political contention, in the broad sense
that 'culture1 is given pride of place, in spite of the
economist bias of orthodox Marxism. This is due above all to
the dual character of the state (cf. Priester 1981, p. 51).
which has to be taken into account in order to understand the
full meaning of the notion of 'positional warfare1. What is at
stake is the mode of mediation between the general interest
and particular interests under the hegemony of a class
claiming to represent the 'nation'. To Gramsci, this is
inconceivable as the mere fbrci.-ig of the interests of just
this one dominating class: 'The fact of hegemony undoubtedly
presupposes that the interests and strivings of the groups
over which hegemony will be exercised are taken account of,
that a certain balance of compromises be formed, that ... the
leading group makes some sacrifices of an economico-
corporative kind' (1930, pp. 154sq). And Gramsci carries this
further when he characterises hegemony as 'the ethic-political
bond that exists between the governing and the governed1
(1975, p. 1236sq).
Seen 'in this light/ hegemony presupposes some fundamental
consensus which mediates between the two poles of a relation
of dominance and which must find some ground in actual social
reality. Of course, for Gramsci, this does not change the
economic bise of hegemony. But tha balance does form a vital
precondition for any stability of class rule and dominance, in
other words, for the formation of a sustainable historical
.bloc.
In keeping with this view, Gramsci sees the division of powers
as a 'consequence of the struggle between the civil society
end the political society of a certain historical period'
(1980, p. 186), where 'political society' clearly denotes the
state, precisely in contradistinction to 'civil society'.
Consequently, Gramsci sees the three powers tied, in varying
degrees, to civil society whose influence is naturally
greatest over Parliament and least over government - all this
notwithstanding 'bourgeois' hegemony,
Only on the basis of these consideration it would appeer
meaningful to talk about 'organically developed "civil
societies"' which manifest themselves, e.g., in 'parties and
unions . . .. ir. a consumer oriented popular culture or in
modernise? religions' (Kebir 1939, p. 58). Even though all
this points to hegemony, still It also documents ambivalence.
In the cesis of subordinate classes, this ambivalence means the
concurrence of tendency towards both resistance and adapting
to given circumstances, the latter by succumbing to
discipline, but also by seli'-discipline. This is to underscore
that the levels .-•'.>£ resistance and of dominance are intimately
intertwined. • • • •
When he poirv.ed to the absence of socletA civile in Russia and
in other 'bae'<warc' societies, Gramsci therefore did more than
Just to ej;pla:n why the revolution of 1917 could take on the
features cf a 'movaag battle'. Certainly, the absence of
'casemates' protecting the core-area of bourgeois dominance
was instrurentnl for the Bolshevik success in a quick frontal
assault. Bu: at the same time, this also meant the absence of
chances for oper. debate and organisation usually go with
'positional farf'.re1, at least in bourgeois democracy. In
spite of all the&s ambivalences, a critical concept of Civil
society requires still some further considerations.
Capitalism is unique in history by a discontinuity between
class dominance anii actu.vl poj.i':ical rule. The bourgeoisie,
while the domi ^ nt v:lass, does not actually rule or govern.
Rather, tha st'.te apparatus with the government at the top
acts as an arbiter between the various bourgeois groupings
pursuing mainly their own private .-.ims; at the same time the
state and government, as we oave seen in our discussion of
Gramsci has :o sufegua^d some minlmel measure of societal
over-all consensus. Th:'s mean.v giving at least some minimal
material eonv.ent '.o the claim to represent the general
interest of til citizenu {see ulso Schiel 1992).
This has deep oonst •juenct'.s for the notion of the modern state
that all exist.ng s'.ates .-re required to conform with, at
least in some Minima.', way. As members of the international
community of stites, "they i'-& expev.ted to control their
territory and tc represent Vhe population living in it.
Inasmuch as thes>\ states res.' for the fulfilment of these
minimal functions and Vor the.'.r internal legitimacy on some
kind of consensus and not on brute force alone, they usually
have recourse to •tie coi-.cept o.'.' the nation, as an 'imagined
community.' ..(.* iders.in 19U5,). .Th:',s community is imagined in the
sense that it is nvver realized, .in the .sense of s face-to-face
situation, buv. nonetheless it hi 3 a measure of reality - it is
by no means siiply '.magin^ ry (cf. ib., p. 15, 108n and
passim)., .
'Community' is. 1 1 be r.aken t^rious In a Gramscian sense. The
formation of a ' ratio:', not in the sense of some ethnically
defined community but rather, as a collective bound together
by some kind of c:mmon .-sest experience or 'tradition' and
solidarity based Vhereo.'. (cf. .'enan 1993, p. 309), pre-
supposes such communal i.selinga but also their concrete base,
some kind of meter..al cormunal relations (see also
Kossler/Schiel 1991;. If •.•.ommuna. feelings which may refer
back to a common hit tory, Including the experience of
liberation struggle ..gainsv. colon: 31 or neo-colonial
domination, are not s.ibstan Mated ,-.y tangible forms of
solidarity, the •,-.onser,sus on which \"he legitimacy of any
political regime necessarily .rests &'; least in the long run
will collapse or evaporate sor.ner or later.
This process has t ?en dimonstriited drexsticelly by the collapse
of political monop.ly in Africa as far as its legitimacy was
derived from the piomise of 'development' (cf. Goulbourne
1987; Shivji 1990). This ,.ill be detailed in the following
section, while in ccnclusi'.n of t.'.is first part we should like
to point out already the vital rol\>. played by existent,
nascent or resux,7ent \orms t••? civii society in the processes
that followed the loss of legitimacy of the old regimes. The
fortunes of the naveme. ts for democracy, in Africa as well as
elsewhere in the Vhird <Jorld, nay alto serve to remind us of a
vital lesson that may b>\ derived, i.a., from Gramsci' s
treatments of clvi.. society: Wh.'.le undstermined and
ambivalent, or ever. pron>\ to se; ve the interests of the powers
that be, civil society sf. 11 den'.tes that vital space and
network of potentially inc.ipenden.: organization that proves
instrumental in the t'.uthenvic arrt'.culation of interests, in
the airing of conflicting perspectives of societal projects,
and in the definition -3f a o er-all concept and perspective of
development that comma .ds a ruiasure if consensus that is .
prerequisite for political legitimacy.
In midst of Algeria's lcig and .iloody fight for national
liberation Frantz Fanon 1965, nsp. ch. 3) already foresaw
contradictions between a ;'ationa\ 'consciousness' and.the .. _
social motives of a comple ".e 'people's mobilization'. The
national movement, he predicted, viuld'in any case only end in
a fragile form without content. Fir him the misery of
nationalism and the weakness of a nationalist ideology was by
no means the doubtful privilege of European colonisers and
members of the master-race. i\is deei'. insight into forthcoming
social processes and transformations, which he himself never
had to witness due to his untir, sly death even before Algeria's
formal independence, is ,".ot onl. underlined by the collapse of
the commando economies ir. the Eastern .Vuropean countries and
the consequent centrifugal tender.lies i.i terms of ever more
particular sub-nationalism emergii-j. Evidence offer also the
ruina of former Yugoslavia .\nd the numerous (heHow) populist
nationalisms meanwhile discredited \n most of t.Se so-called
Third World countries.
Among the more important (althmgh no- so wi.dely acknowledged)
insights offered so far into t) 3 critical d«bate on
nationalism, are those of the 1 te Nicos Povlantzas. His
theoretical thoughts concerning -.apita.'.ist/b.iurgeois state
formation and structures are sti!» \ relevant. He shows (1990)
like others such as Hobsbawm - tht t the phenomenon 'nation'
grows into a new dimension tnd queAity in the csn-:ext of
emerging capitalist (nation-) state.. 'Verritory', (seen as
the spatial component) as well as 'tradition' ani 'history' as
components of time, enter a new inte:relate-3 combination,
resulting finally in the specific new type :.v£ "invention of
tradition" (Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983) and "imagined communities"
(Anderson 1983). As PoulantzaB has pc.'.nted out already prior
10
to these essential new analyses, the relations between
territory and tlme/tredition/history sonatitut'.i ':n& 'modern'
nation. The capitalist state draws the border Lines by
constituting (and defining) what is inside its boundaries -
namely people and nation - and consolidates thi.- inferiority
{alBO by means;-of internalisation through social, norms and
values, last but not least however materially in termg of a
legal apparatus designed accordingly and fo.llowiTig the defined
criteria). The national unity,.says Poulant2.es (1978) becomes
the historicity of a territory, the territor.lali;ation of
history, while the national tradition of a ti\rri:ory
materialise within the nation-state (see also 'i'.avunan 1990).
Nationalist movements in the 20th century are characterised by
a historic situation markedly different from thi; factors
constituting the emergence of nationalism and mil: ion-states in
Western Europe during the late 18th and 19th cenvury. The
combination of national superiority, with the perspectives of
an industrial-capitalist model of development became
increasingly precarious, the more the world was .'tinked towards
strong, industrialised nation-states or fell dlri'.ctly under
their spheres of interest and influence.
Among probably the most important of the new movements of
resistance against this system, provoked by old and new
dependencies, were during the 20th century the eriti-colonlal
ones. They reacted towards the further expansion of the
direct spheres of domination especially of Western European
nation states"in overseas territories. Their colonial systems
explicitly denied the constitutional equality to the colonized
population, in marked contrast to the formal equsiity offered
to citizens within their own nation sxates.
Anticolonial movements as a result emerged in direct conflict
with features and phenomena of a nationalism devfeloi>ed in
Western Europe. It would be erroneous, however, to equate
anticolonial movements with nationalise. Quite contrary, a
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number of anticolonial movements originally hoc a genuine
internationalist perspective. This applies 1.9. for the
anticolonial resistance movement in Indonesia early this
century, but also for the orientation towards th«i colonial
power as the common enemy in the early stages of the national
liberation movements in the former Portuguese colon.! es in
Africa during the 1950s. The actual turn towards nationalism
often took place only after the internationalist perspective
was frustrated, or met limitations, such as the orientation of
the anticolonial struggle on a particularly, colon.'.aliy
defined and structured territory.
The colonial case normally was confronted with tt.&
constellation, that the construction of a continuity in terms
of state was not applicable. With very few exceptions,
snticolonial movements had to orientate at those colonial
boundaries, which so often have been criticised as deliberate
and artificial. The constitution of post-colonial states
based (at least on the African and Asian continent)
essentially on the acceptance and immunity of theso border
lines drawn around territorial entities during the colonial
era. In Latin America, where decolonisation and state
formation took place more than a century before, sometimes
drastic changes in territorial boundaries took place by means
of wars between the now formally independent 3tet.es. The
definition of these states as 'nations', however, thereby were
neither more rational then anywhere elae, nor did it offer
their Inhabitants more homogeneity and solidarity aniong
themselves. With very few exceptions,, therefore, tost-
colonial states do not offer convincing 3vidence for an '?'•'•"
ethnically determined, state-centred nationalism. Such
exceptions might include specific products of colonial rule,
where especially in the case of British 'indi:ect rule' pre-
coloniel state-formation not only becama conserved, but even
more so thoroughly transformed and modernised. This applies
to a certain extent to Lesotho and Swaziland, leys so to
Botswana in the Southern African region, but certair;iy';to the
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emirates at the Persian-Arabian Gulf or to 3ru-.ei. In these
cases, 'indirect rule' included the conscious selection of
ruling groups and the re-constructior of traditions to
legitimise their dominance.
Where anticolonial movements had a net:.oni!lit/t orientation,
they had their point of reference normally ir. th;i existing
colonial boundaries of a so defined territory. This also
applied for such movements, which under -.he misleading claim
of representing a national organisation 'jleurly articulated
ethnically defined ambitions. A prominent example for such
cases has been the FNLA in Angola: Its etnni<: basis were
without doubts the Bakbngo. Their sefi.le1r.2nt area includes
not only the North of Angola, but also the West o:: Zaire and
bigger portion of Congo. But FNLA-leader Ho3Sen Roberto was
not bothered at ell, to claim nevertheless tl:e leading
political rule for the whole of Angola. j;th.\ic affinity,
however, very much so influenced and d.*tf,rmi\ied nis strategic
alliance with dictator Mobutu in neighoo.irir.g Zaire. This is
one of the more prominent examples of a grcjp of a more
'tribalist' nature, which (mis)used the co.Yoni »lly determined
boundaries as definition for its own ::J sld of activity as a
'nationalist' movement.
Nationalist movements in colonised sec:stlss normally emerged
within small circles and social groups w! o Jiad specific
experiences with colonial oppression a id .lis.jrimination, but
also with modernisation. Often these we:e f.tudents, who
originally started to organise themee.'.vej abroad, in the
colonial 'motherland', end finally "out I'.1, up a national
ideology with reference to their common co/.onised home
country. It is not very surprising, <;t it rhece groups of
mainly intellectuals not only served ns a ?oi it of departure
for the organisation of anti-colonial jartles, but also as a
framework for the formation of alliances find strategic
networks. These were later potential :;ecrui::ment agencies or
the basis for operations to use the so.:i? i. transition towards
13
decolonisation for securing access tc ciCisive positions
within the new state apparatus, there 3;• gaining opportunities
for appropriation, (cf. Bayart 1989). .
The post-colonial situation is more c'.ei:ending with, regard to a
national ideology. Post-colonial status face the problem to
relate to fixed points .of reference fc: the own existence,
exceeding the more or less incidental and arbitrary drawing of
border lines around certain territo.vi.nl entities. In some
cases - especially ibn South East a.si», Ethiopia, Mexico or
fragile lines of tradition recurring :o precolonial phenomena.
Independent of their credibility, sue 1 legitimising attempts
cannot remove or solve problems of a Jiversity of different
local and regional, often ethnically defined identifications
within the given territory of the stute. Next to the
strategy, to define 'minorities' and e:.ther oppress them or
compensate them by means of offering particular rights,
feature therefore exercises promine-it.'y., which build an own
identity and strengthen it ideologically.
Such strategies were often applied in the post-colonial era of
African governments. They propagated specific 'national'
Ideologies, often combined with more or less serious claims of
'socialism'. The Kenyan 'harambee', Tanzanian 'ujamaa'
Zambian 'humanism' might serve as such typical examples of
designing an own brand or label. Mere seriously have been the
conscious and deliberate - often explicitly declared - efforts
to constitute national identity in :he context of national
wars of liberation - following the slogan "to be born e
nation" (Swapo of Namibia 1981) in the process of a militant
and military struggle. In such cas.ss, national cohesion was
expected and supposed to be created within the struggle for
national liberation by means of a common historic experience
shared, which at the same time would overcome regional
differences. A step further move concepts of national
liberation struggles taking into account and acknowledging the
competition between several 'national projects', possibly
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because of different orientations in terms of 'class
interests' (see esp. No Sizwe 1979). Into this category falls
the admission (i.a. by such prominent activists like Frantz
Fanon and Amilcar Cabral), that with the removal of direct
'national' oppression, i.e. the unifying motive of a national
liberation struggle, the internal antagonisms end
contradictions shell be disclosed. The definition of nation
es a peaceful community in harmony turns, out as a dangerous
illusion. Also because it might well become the point of
departure for new oppression, which is now directed towards
the articulation of inner-social conflicts.
The national perspective promises the colonised a hitherto
denied acceptance as free and equal citizens within a state.
An 'imagined community' of this type is by no means only
fiction. Instead, it demands a more Substantial level, which
realises also in material terms such expectations for
participants in such a national project. This might be one of
the driving forces for a number of post-colonial states, to
embark so vigorously upon a strategy of 'developmentalism'
(see i.a. Shivji 1990 and 1991). The driving force for such
'developmentalist' exercises and promises could often be
located within the expectations of the masses directed towards
national independence. This applies especially in those
cases, in which sovereignty was achieved only after long,
bitter and bloody struggles demanding serious sacrifices from
the people.
The created expectations aimed at receiving the final reward
by means of the minimum of what states in other parts of the
world offer to and secure for their members: security not
only in the sense of protection against, physical violence
exercised either by the (colonial) organs of state or
individual representatives of such state power, but also
security in the sense of a minimal material living condition.
The inability of post-colonial states, to achieve by means of
successful development strategies economic growth of the
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desired and needed type of the benefit of the majority of
people, has questioned their credibility: There is a lack of
the substantial basis of such states as the legitimate
representatives of the imagined communities. As a result, in
most post-colonial states on the continent the attempts to
construct and constitute a non-ethnic national identity have
ended in a fundamental crisis if not even failed completely. •
In spite of this it remains a fact that Bnticolonial -movements-
first of all acted on basis of a 'national' programme. Post-
colonial states also are still defined as national entities.
It is therefore worthwhile to reflect and consider, for what
reasons the nation even as an obvious fiction has played (and
still continues to play) such a prominent role.
The colonial state has not only been the opponent and enemy of
the anti-colonial and nationalist movements. At the same
time, it also was the direct predecessor of those states,
which emerged after independence. The colonial state
formation in Africa was to a high degree a "cultural project"
(Young 1988). It hed to do with the transfer of
administrative techniques and skills, as well as political
processes, to secure the hegemony of the colonial power. As a
model for both, the colonial as well as the post-colonial
state, therefore, served the metropolitan state. This model,
however, as was indicated above, did not meet the different
social conditions of development of state and action in these
countries.
Essential aspects that had been fought for and were secured
within the metropolitan states only during the 20th century
(especially the constitutionally guaranteed participation of
the general population as formally equal citizens) had in the
case of the colonies been denied to the people outside of the
settler communities. Such a practice of exclusive rule over
decades of foreign domination resulted in a fatal historic.
legacy. Not only was colonial rule oriented towards the
16
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metropolis imposing the system; even worse, its dictatorial
character anfl rigid strategies of domination and oppression
led towards infantilisation of the population, the creation of
a subordinate culture of obeyance and the adaptation to
authorities (cf. Fatton 1990). These dispositions and
structures of personalities, created or at least decisively
enforced during and under colonial socialisation processes,
left-little room for open resistance, protest and revolt, even
less for the training and experiencing of democratic
behaviour.
In contrast end parallel to this process of fostering the
'authoritarian character', particulariet-regional, especially
ethnic-tribal identities were enhanced or even created in
cases where not being already available (see i.a. Melber
1985). Amilcar Cabrel, the president of the PAIGC,
assassinated in early 1973, concluded in his analytical
writings that there was therefore a need to distinguish
carefully between the (potentially destructive) ethnic-tribal
and (potentially constructive) regional-cultural Identities,
The liberation movement would have to acknowledge the
contradictory state of the cultural panorama and to assess
which positive values should be maintained.
In the situation of the anticolonlal struggle, defined already
as national, the nation became the predominantly politically
determined anti-thesis to the colonial system of an ethnic-
particularist apparatus of power designed and directed by a
white minority. Such a nationalism is decisively based on the
negation of foreign rule by the organisation of the liberation
struggle, i.e. the 'national' liberation movement. Its
essential slogan appeals to the one nation in contrast to
manyfold particular, especially 'ethnically' oriented
loyalties (the prominent slogan "one xyz, one nation" is a
special case in point). The myth 'nation' is thereby
challenging the colonially enforced myth 'tribe'. The fiction
of a unification and homogenisation of a territory's
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population through a nation created by means of a liberation
struggle, can rely upon the social polarisation established
through the colonial system of oppression. The political-
cultural tendency towards uniformity is therefore ...
complementary to the colonial strategy of 'divide and rule'.
The even more radical confrontation within a struggle of
liberation led militarily, increases and enforces such a
tendency.
The idealistic, voluntaristic over-emphasis of nationalism
must be seen in this light also as a compensation for the .
missing material reality. It represents the desperate attempt
to create the substantial basis through the compensating
ideological weapon of nationalism. This serves as the
idealistic engine for escape. Consequently, aware of this
interrelationship and linkage, we ought to define anew the
dialectics of 'tribe' and 'nation' as symptoms of a material .
reality and function of a political process. The anti-
colonial nationalist resistance turns against the
'tribalisation' of the colonized by means of demanding a
'nationalisation of the consciousness'.
Resentments created or at lease enforced by a colonial
'tribalism1, however, are not liquidated simply through the
mere existence of a national movement. Neither can they just
be ignored nor declared as garbage and put aside to become -
history of a past. Although such an approach has very often
been practised within decolonising African societies, whose
new rulers decided to establish strictly organised
hierarchical and centralized Unitarian states. Real
experiences nevertheless point into a different direction.
Social conflicts of distribution after independence in many
cases documented, that after the removal of the negative point
of reference, i.e. the colonial regime resulting in common
rejection and resistance, internal contradictions already
existing but being of a secondary nature for the time of the
anti-colonial struggle for liberation, emerged anew, in
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contrast to most other leaders of national liberation
movements, Amilcar Cabral had predicted such a revitalisetion
already long before state power could be taken over (which
unfortunately he himself was not able to witness and
experience any more). Too little attention, however, has
originally been paid to the fact, that those inner-social
contractions basically also use on ethnic-particulerist body
for their articulation. This is to a certain extent also an
immediate response to the post-colonial state's power
otruoturo, to use the national eaatuwe; Ct/X M6iAL6J.AJ.iiy ol
least parts of a loyalty and legitimacy among the people, who
have expected more in terms of material well-being and social
equality. This is doomed to fail, however: If the state
should achieve a minimum of legitimacy as representative of
the common interest, objectively existing collective identity
is as much a prerequisite as its internalisation by the
individuals affected (see van Cranenburgh 1990).
Particularly under the specific condition of African societies
exists to a certain extent the alternative of a retreat from
state in the sense of the tradition of the 'exit option'
(Bayart 1989, Hyden i960 and 19B3). For a few communities
this might seem to be an alternative that makes sense. The
'national project', of course, under such circumstances would
be doomed to failure, however. More realistic and closer to
reality is another option practised in many cases: the
competition of ethnically defined (or self-declared) interest
groups for the control of the centralized state apparatus.
Such rivalry for access to power and wealth has often resulted
in military conflicts. Prominent cases ere Liberia, Rwanda
and Somalia;'" But also in Angola the military conflicts after
the Collapse of the Portuguese colonial rule were basically
influenced by ethnic mobilisation (in this particular case
however admittedly and obviously enforced externally through
the South African and US-American policy).
For post-colonial states on the African continent (and more
19
generally in so-called Third World regions) the challenge lies
i.e. in the situation characterised by a particular social
situation of heterogeneity and a resulting need of cohesion
and consensus not existing. Political-cultural factors have 8
particular relevance in such a constellation, not least for
the said 'national' and 'ethnic' identities. The question
remains, whether such norms and values and their
internelisation, serving the interest and needs of a more
homogeneous 'national project', can be imposed from the
commando heights of formal state power occupied by the new
elites. In most cases, such attempts have only resulted so
far in the emergence of once again narrowly defined and
limited relations of dominance and subordination. If there
are solutions, then it seems that they have to deal in much
more detail with aspects of political-cultural hegemony and
the basis of social systems.
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